The two challenges Europe has to cope with are its economic decline, with the concomitant grave unemployment rate, especially among the young, and the management of migration fluxes, from which, both directly and indirectly, emerges the issue of security. Both challenges, till now inadequately tackled by national governments, share a common element: they interest Europe as a whole, albeit each European State was hurt in different ways. Thus, the challenges cannot be dealt with and resolved efficiently without common initiatives and measures, based on common decisions. This is what has been done in order to stimulate growth and employment, but only through intergovernmental mechanisms. Some important results have been achieved, e.g. concerning the European Bank Union, however, the wanted result, i.e. the relaunching of economic growth and employment, has not been obtained so far. This is apparent once a comparison is made with the U.S., where the global economic crisis had begun. What is lacking on this side of the Atlantic is a common governance of the European economy, which is not that of intergovernmental summits, anchored to the paralyzing mechanism of unanimity. There has not been a EU government based on a unified fiscal system of the Union, enjoying the effective support of the EU Parliament, so that its choices are democratically legitimized.
Even worse is the absence of a common EU government to manage the migration fluxes, to fight terrorism, and to guarantee security and defence. Restoring national borders between the EU countries, as some countries wish to do, most unfortunately, would not only mean to load on each country an unbearable systemic burden (organizational and economic) but would also mean to jeopardize the stability of the single European market: a disrupting outcome. A unified European border management is instead necessary, as well as a coordinated management of migrants regarding both their numbers and their distribution within the EU memberstates, regulated through suitable incentives and disincentives. As for terrorism, had a common intelligence service been instituted, with a joint and transparent handling of the data, perhaps the Paris massacre would have been prevented. With regard to defense, it is of common knowledge that a European defense, which could already be initiated with the Treaty of Lisbon, would be less costly to European citizens and would be much more efficient. Thus, what is truly needed in order to cope with these challenges is a common European government, still lacking so far. To tackle the economy, it is possible, necessary and legally feasible to bring about an enhanced co-operation within the Eurozone, anchored to the EU Parliament. To tackle the defense, a structured co-operation is possible, even involving a few European countries. To tackle migration fluxes, as well as terrorism, a limited configuration dividing Europe across seems instead not practicable. These guidelines are already doable with existing treaties: for other ends, like a European fiscal system, some incisive modifications of the treaties are needed. On both aims the EU parliamentary committee on constitutional 25 affairs has been working effectively. Authoritative observers insist upon pushing forward towards a European federal structure. The five presidents' report (European Council, Commission, ECB, Eurogroup and EP) addresses the federal political union with the utmost vagueness. It should be clear what this issue is all about. Establishing a common European government implies three things: 1) taking decisions together by qualified majority, when unanimity is not achieved; 2) entrusting to a single authority (the Commission) the task of carrying out the actions of a European government, endowed with the necessary resources; 3) anchoring basic decision-making, both legislative and political, to the European Parliament's vote. Nothing less, nothing more. All this might seem trivial, but it isn't. Up until now a directoire-based method has been adopted to deal with the economy, led by Germany and having the veto right to make it insurmountable. Hence, only the intergovernmental method has so far prevailed. For foreign policy and international operations not even that has been done: Europe has proceeded in dribs and drabs, even when common interest was clearly at stake, e.g. in Iraq, the Middle-East, Libya and Syria. And yet the Ukrainian crisis, where military escalation was eventually stopped following the accords which had been negotiated on behalf of the EU by Angela Merkel and François Hollande, shows what Europe could do when it displays at least an embryo of common action. Migration-wise, the urgency to create a functioning common governance is even more evident. Likewise, a European defense can only be managed, in a democratic system, by a common government, with the two levels constituted by the European Council, which must deliberate by qualified majority in order to move forward, and the European Commission which, especially after the 2014 innovative election procedures, is democratically legitimized by both the EU Parliament and the EU Council.
Translated by Alon Helled
WouldaSuper-statebeformedthisway,depriving of authority Europe's national states? Absolutely not! The common budget (at least that of the current, as well as the future, Eurozone) could increase from 1% to 2% or 3% of the European GDP, partially deriving from national transfers, and partially from common taxes (carbon tax, financial transaction tax), partially from Project bonds: something quite different compared to the U.S. federal budget, that amounts to about 25% of its GDP. In common should be governed only what national states cannot even now administer by themselves: the principle of subsidiarity, as provided in the EU treaties, is of primary importance, and must operate both bottom-up and top-downwards. No transfer of sovereignty, therefore, but a re-acquisition of shared sovereignty through a democratic method, based on the dual legitimacy of the democratically elected European Parliament and the States sitting in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. This perspective is in full continuity -as far as the EU institutions and the constitutional rules to be adopted are concerned -with the path followed by the Union in 60 years of European integration, from 1950 to 2008. Also the double geometry of a closer union for the Eurozone and a larger one for the European internal market and for security, is feasible through relatively simple procedures and institutional reforms; as long as, especially in France and Germany, there is the political willingness to reach these ends. The Italian government could play an important spurring role as happened in the past for key passages. With a common governance of the economy and security, and only thus and based on its achievements, could the EU regain the concrete and ideal attractiveness in the eyes of the European citizenry that the shortsightedness of national governments has put seriously in question, starting a downward process that could become irreversible.
